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CONTRACTS
I. EXCEPTION TO THE SURETYSHIP PROVISION OF
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The South Carolina Statute of Frauds1 requires that certain
agreements, to be legally enforceable, be in writing and signed.
One such agreement is a "special promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another person."' 2 An oral promise
guaranteeing the debt of a third party, however, may be en-
forced under one of several "exceptions." 3 Two exceptions, the
"main purpose" and the "original undertaking" doctrines, have
been recognized by South Carolina courts for at least a century.4
The "main purpose" doctrine focuses on the primary moti-
vation for the guarantor's promise. The South Carolina Supreme
Court generally has concluded that "'where the promise to pay
a debt incurred by another is made as a part of the transaction
where the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to
answer for the debt of another, but to subserve some purpose of
his own, his promise is not within the Statute.' "' The original
undertaking doctrine, however, stresses facts which indicate that
the guarantee is a new agreement separate from the underlying
debt. The court frequently has asserted that "'where the agree-
ment to pay the debt of another is part of an original undertak-
ing between the parties, and it is not collateral to the origination
of the debt, the Statute does not apply.' " Although the result
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-3-10 (1976). This section is essentially unchanged from the
seventeenth century English Statute from which it was adopted. An Act for Prevention
of Frauds and Perjuries, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 3.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-3-10(2) (1976).
3. The term "exception" is used for convenience. The generally recognized "excep-
tions" more accurately refer to situations in which the Statute of Frauds is not applica-
ble at all, rather than to exceptional circumstances carved out of the statutory scheme.
4. E.g., Robertson v. Hunter, 29 S.C. 9, 13-14, 6 S.E. 850, 852-53 (1888). The court
has indicated that there may be more than two exceptions. See Campbell v. Hickory
Farms, 258 S.C. 563, 568-69, 190 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1972).
5. General Elec. Co. v. Lions Gate, 273 S.C. 88, 90, 254 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1979)(quot-
ing Campbell v. Hickory Farms, 258 S.C. 563, 568, 190 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1972)). See Robert-
son v. Hunter, 29 S.C. 9, 13-14, 6 S.E. 850, 852-53 (1888).
6. General Elec. Co. v. Lions Gate, 273 S.C. 88, 90, 254 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1979) (quot-
ing Campbell v. Hickory Farms, 258 S.C. 563, 568-69, 190 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1972)).
1
Knight: Contracts
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
reached by the court when applying these two exceptions gener-
ally has been consistent,7 the main purpose and original under-
taking doctrines have not always been treated as conceptually
distinct.'
In General Electric Co. v. Lions Gate,9 the court, appar-
ently applying both exceptions indistinguishably, held that an
oral promise to pay a debt incurred by a party other than the
promisor was enforceable despite the Statute of Frauds. In Nov-
ember, 1974, General Electric sold appliances to the general con-
tractor for Lions Gate condominiums. The appliances subse-
quently were installed in the condominium units. The general
contractor, however, failed to pay the purchase price for the ap-
pliances. When collection efforts against the general contractor
proved futile, General Electric began negotiations with Lions
Gate, the partnership that owned the condominiums. During
these negotiations, General Electric mentioned the possibility of
its filing a mechanic's lien on the condominiums if the delin-
quent account was not paid. To prevent this action, Lions Gate
orally agreed to issue a check sufficient to satisfy the debt,
jointly payable to General Electric and the general contractor.
Lions Gate issued a check, payable only to the general contrac-
tor, one week later. General Electric was never paid. 10
General Electric sued both the general contractor and the
Lions Gate partnership. The general contractor defaulted and
the case was tried only against Lions Gate. The jury returned a
verdict against Lions Gate for the sale price of the appliances.
The basis underlying the result in the trial court was that the
partnership had guaranteed the payments owed by the general
contractor. Lions Gate unsuccessfully attempted to defend by
relying on the Statute of Frauds.1" On appeal, the supreme court
held that "[t]he evidence at bar was sufficient for the jury to
7. See, e.g., Crapps v. Spivey, 271 S.C. 29, 244 S.E.2d 520 (1978); Campbell v. Hick-
ory Farms, 258 S.C. 563, 190 S.E.2d 26 (1972); Stackhouse v. Pure Oil Co., 176 S.C. 318,
180 S.E. 188 (1935); American Wholesale Corp. v. Mauldin, 128 S.C. 241, 122 S.E. 576
(1924); Gaines v. Durham, 124 S.C. 435, 117 S.E. 732 (1923); Lorick & Lowrance v. Cald-
well, 85 S.C. 94, 67 S.E. 143 (1910); J. A. Ellis & Co. v. Carroll, 68 S.C. 376, 47 S.E. 679
(1904); Robertson v. Hunter, 29 S.C. 9, 6 S.E. 850 (1888).
8. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text infra.
9. 273 S.C. 88, 254 S.E.2d 305 (1979).
10. Id. at 89-90, 254 S.E.2d at 306-07.
11. Id. at 90, 254 S.E.2d at 307. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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CONTRACTS
reasonably conclude that. . . [the oral] promise was supported
by the consideration necessary to remove it from the statute of
frauds." 2
The court based its conclusion on the main purpose and
original undertaking exceptions to the suretyship section of the
Statute of Frauds, but did not differentiate between the two
doctrines nor indicate which doctrine was controlling. After
quoting a statement of the two doctrines from an earlier case, 3
the court referred to them as a single exception, stating that
"[iln determining whether an agreement can be classified under
the 'main purpose' or 'original undertaking' exception, the
courts must rely on the circumstances of each particular case
... ,14 At another point in the opinion, however, the court
treated the two doctrines separately, asserting that "[t]o be en-
forceable under either theory, the promise like all other con-
tractual obligations, must be supported by independent consid-
eration in the form of advantage to the promisor or a detriment
to the promisee."' 5 This ambiguous treatment of the distinction
between the main purpose and original undertaking doctrines
presents conceptual problems.
Prior South Carolina cases recognized a distinction between
the two exceptions. Some cases directed attention to only the
main purpose doctrine,6 while others referred only to the origi-
nal undertaking doctrine.27 Still others succinctly stated both
doctrines as separate concepts, but perfunctorily arrived at a
result without establishing which doctrine was controlling. 18
Any distinction, however, be illusory, as the supreme court's
discussion of the concept of consideration in Lions Gate
demonstrated.
The controlling factor, in the court's opinion, was the value
12. 273 S.C. at 92, 254 S.E.2d at 308.
13. Id. at 90, 254 S.E.2d at 307 (quoting Campbell v. Hickory Farms, 258 S.C. 563,
568-69, 190 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1972)).
14. 273 S.C. at 90, 254 S.E.2d at 307 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 91, 254 S.E.2d at 307 (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Crapps v. Spivey, 271 S.C. 29, 244 S.E.2d 520 (1978); American Whole-
sale Corp. v. Mauldin, 128 S.C. 241, 122 S.E. 576 (1924); Turner v. Lyles, 68 S.C. 392, 48
S.E. 301 (1904).
17. See, e.g., Stackhouse v. Pure Oil Co., 176 S.C. 318, 180 S.E. 188 (1935); Gaines v.
Durham, 124 S.C. 435, 117 S.E. 732 (1923); J. A. Ellis & Co. v. Carroll, 68 S.C. 376, 47
S.E. 679 (1904).
18. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hickory Farms, 258 S.C. 563, 190 S.E.2d 26 (1972).
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given to General Electric's decision not to file a mechanic's lien
against Lions Gate. The court concluded that General Electric's
forbearance to file a mechanic's lien was, under the facts of this
case, sufficient consideration to support Lions Gate's oral guar-
antee of the contractor's debt.19 The court held that General
Electric relied to its detriment on Lions Gate's promise to issue
a check jointly payable to General Electric and the general con-
tractor. General Electric's forebearance was found also to di-
rectly benefit only the promisor partnership because the filing of
a lien would have prejudiced Lions Gate's interest in the
property.2
0
Any conceptual distinction between the main purpose doc-
trine and the original undertaking doctrine was blurred by the
court's assertion that, to be enforceable under either, an oral
promise must meet a single test. The court asserted that the oral
promise "must be supported by an independent consideration in
the form of an advantage to the promisor or a detriment to the
promisee. ' '21 General Electric's forbearance was found not only
to be "a sufficient consideration for a promise. . . in the general
law of contracts, ' 22 but also "the consideration necessary to re-
move . . . [Lions Gate's promise] from the statute of frauds. '23
The court's careful analysis of the detriment and benefit in-
volved, and its apparent recognition of the necessity for one
level of consideration under general contract law and a higher
level to escape the Statute of Frauds, imply that the test for
both doctrines is whether the consideration, in the particular
case, has a sufficient value to except the promise from the signed
writing requirement.
Professor Corbin contends that "certain kinds of considera-
tion will prevent a promise from being one 'to answer for the
debt of another' and will make the promisor a debtor on his own
account. ' 24 In some cases, states Corbin, "the consideration will
be found to be of such a character as in itself to be practically
decisive; generally, however, it is merely one of the facts to be
19. 273 S.C. at 91-92, 254 S.E.2d at 307.
20. Id. at 91, 254 S.E.2d at 307.
21. Id. at 91-92, 254 S.E.2d at 307.
22. Id. at 91, 254 S.E.2d at 307.
23. Id. at 92, 254 S.E.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
24. 2 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 367, at 279 (1950). See 37 C.J.S. Statute of
Frauds § 21(a), at 521 (1943).
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given weight as evidence of other more important ones."2
Neither a characterization of the undertaking as collateral or
original26 nor a determination of the leading object (main pur-
pose) is an adequate test,2 7 according to Corbin. This preemi-
nent author thus blends the two doctrines conceptually and
postulates that in determining the applicability of the Statute of
Frauds, a court must judge in each case the objects, motives, and
purposes as well as the beneficial character of the consider-
ation.
28
If the court's opinion in Lions Gate was both a blending of
the two doctrines and a determination that the character of the
consideration was itself decisive, the case is supported by Pro-
fessor Corbin's view. For the consideration to attain the required
higher level, however, the court should have established that
General Electric's forbearance from pursuing the lien "seemed of
such advantage to the promisor that he made the promise in re-
turn for it quite irrespective of any contemplated benefit to a
third person, and his purpose was to get this advantage and not
to benefit another. '29 The South Carolina Supreme Court found
that General Electric's "forbearance would and could have in-
ured only to the personal benefit of appellant."30 The court did
not expressly conclude that Lions Gate's purpose was to gain the
advantage of the forbearance, but that purpose seems clearly im-
plied in the quoted language. The opinion, interpreted in this
manner, seems to fit well within Corbin's approach.
Lions Gate, therefore, may provide an important step to-
ward clarification in South Carolina of the conceptual problems
in attempted distinctions between the main purpose doctrine
and the original undertaking doctrine. As Professor Corbin indi-
cates, courts that merely categorize, under either the main pur-
pose or original undertaking doctrine, the basis for excepting a
particular oral promise from the Statute of Frauds do not ade-
quately analyze the issue.31 Prior South Carolina cases at-
25. A. CORBIN, supra note 24, § 377, at 308.
26. Id. § 348, at 218.
27. Id. § 377, at 308 (Corbin uses the term "leading object" as a synonym for "main
purpose.")
28. A. CORBIN, supra note 24, § 377, at 308.
29. Id. § 379, at 313. See 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds § 21(a), at 531 (1943).
30. 273 S.C. at 92, 254 S.E.2d at 307 (emphasis added).
31. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
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tempted varying degrees of categorization.32 In Lions Gate, the
court's discussion of the type of consideration necessary to re-
move an oral promise from the Statute of Frauds closely aligns
South Carolina law with Corbin's views and tends to alleviate
the conceptual problems inherent in prior attempts at doctrinal
distinctions. The test to be used under both the main purpose
and original undertaking doctrines after Lions Gate, therefore, is
whether the consideration in support of the oral promise guaran-
teeing the debt of another is of a quality sufficient to ensure that
the consideration alone constitutes the actual inducement for
the promise. Because the test for both doctrines is the same, any
distinction between the two is unimportant and they become es-
sentially one exception.
II. BREACH OF "AT-WILL" EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Legal and social aspects of breaches of "at-will" employ-
ment contracts are the subjects of recent national' s and interna-
tional 4 academic concern. Judicial decisions in this area are es-
pecially important because of their impact on other areas of the
law5 and on the status of traditional rules.38 From its formula-
tion in the 1870s until 1959,3' the common-law rule regarding
32. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
33. See, e.g., Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in
the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 1-4 (1979).
34. See England, Recent Developments in Wrongful Dismissal Laws and Some
Pointers for Reform, 16 ALTA. L. REV. 470 passim (1978)(discussing the Nova Scotia
Code and Canadian developments); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 508-19, 532 (1976)(discussing the
developments in France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden).
35. Decisions regarding breach of employment contracts have a broad impact on (1)
master and servant law, See Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exer-
cise of Employer Disciplinary Power: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 428,
432 (1964); see generally Kahn-Freund, Blackstone's Neglected Child: The Contract of
Employment, 93 LAW Q. REv. 508, 509 (1977), (2) workmen's compensation law, see, e.g.,
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Workmen's Com-
pensation, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REv. 219 (1980), (3) consti-
tutional law, see Peck, supra note 33, at 4, 13-42, and (4) labor law, see Note, A Common
Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1443-45
(1975).
36, See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974);
Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1418 (1967).
37. An exception to the general rule was first recognized in Petermann v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See text accompany-
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termination of "at-will" employment contracts remained virtu-
ally unchanged in all United States, jurisdictions: 8
Despite its sometimes harsh operation and the obvious oppor-
tunities for abuse it affords an unscrupulous employer, few le-
gal principles would seem to be better settled than the broad
generality that an employment for an indefinite term is re-
garded as an employment at will which may be terminated at
any time by either party for any reason or for no reason at
all.
3 9
The South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its consistent and
strict adherence to this rule40 in Ross v. Life Insurance Co. of
Virginia41 and Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co. 42 Although the
South Carolina court continues to apply the common-law rule, it
does recognize that disagreement among commentators and
other courts exists on this issue. The time for reconsideration of
the rule in light of the modern employer-employee relationship
has arrived.
In Ross, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia terminated
plaintiff-salesman's employment for reasons that plaintiff felt
were unjustified. Plaintiff, asserting that he had performed
faithfully, sued his defendant-employer for wrongful discharge.
The lower court sustained defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action and the supreme
court affirmed. Plaintiff unsuccessfully suggested several theo-
ries of recovery to the court.43 He failed principally, as the court
explained, because South Carolina embraces the general rule
that at-will employment contracts may be terminated at any
time for any reason or for no reason at all."
The Hudson decision was more complex. Plaintiff was in-
ing notes 52-62 infra.
38. Peck, supra note 33, at 2.
39. Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271, 271 (1975).
40. See, e.g., Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486
(1955); Raley v. Darling Shop, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950); Sheally v. Fowler,
182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936).
41. - S.C. -, 259 S.E.2d 814 (1979).
42. - S.C. -, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979). See Workmen's Compensation, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REV. 219, 219 (1980).
43. Plaintiff's theories were wrongful termination, conspiracy, and tortious interfer-
ence. - S.C. at __, 259 S.E.2d at 815.
44. Id.
1980]
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jured on his job at the Zenith Engraving Company and was at-
tempting to obtain workmen's compensation benefits when he
was fired. Defendant presented three reasons for terminating
plaintiff's at-will employment: Plaintiff did not show intention
to return to work; plaintiff did not demonstrate the physical
ability to resume his duties; and the position plaintiff had occu-
pied previously was discontinued. 5 Plaintiff appealed from the
trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and presented two theories of recovery to the supreme
court. First, he argued that Zenith's termination of his employ-
ment contract breached an implied promise of continued em-
ployment created when defendant arranged less strenuous work
for plaintiff during prior periods of disability.46 Second, he as-
serted that termination during pursuit of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, because maliciously motivated, violated public pol-
icy.4 7 The court rejected both of these theories, concluding that
the employer has "exercised only its legal right to terminate...
[plaintiff], who was an employee at will." 48 The court acknowl-
edged that an exception to the general rule regarding at-will em-
ployment contracts has been recognized by "a minority of juris-
dictions. . . when there has been a violation of public policy."49
The court, however, neither recognized nor rejected the excep-
tion, but rather avoided its consideration by relying on the
traditional common-law rule and South Carolina precedent.50
The court in Ross and Hudson aligned contemporary South
Carolina law with the common-law rule that an employer has a
right to terminate for any reason or for no reason at all. Lan-
guage in the Hudson opinion, however, acknowledges the cur-
rent trend of both courts and commentators toward mitigating
the harshness of the rule. No South Carolina decision to date
has adequately dealt with the issues presented by this trend.5 1
45. - S.C. at - , 259 S.E.2d at 813.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hudson v. Life Ins. Co., - S.C. at - , 259 S.E.2d at 814.
49. Id. at -, 259 S.E,2d at 813.
50. Id. (citing Raley v. Darling Shop, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950)). In
Raley, plaintiff's job was threatened when she filed for workmen's compensation benefits.
After filing, she was fired. The court skirted any public policy exception by pointing out
that, although plaintiff had been threatened, she still filed her claim.
51. In Raley v. Darling Shop, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950), the court
approached these issues but avoided decision. See note 50 supra. Raley was a pre-1959
[Vol. 32
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A number of states that consistently had adhered to the
common-law rule succumbed recently to the academic sentiment
toward harshly-treated employees.2 The academic criticism has
resulted in the recognition of a strong exception to the common-
law rule rather than its complete abrogation. The exception has
taken the form of a "trilateral" balancing scheme:5 3 "the em-
ployer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his
employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper
balance between the two."'5 4 Commentators still recommend that
either the legislatures55 or the courts5" abrogate the entire com-
mon-law rule, but no jurisdiction yet has taken this step.57 Since
the exception was first recognized in Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,"8 commentators have postulated sev-
eral possible theories of recovery: in addition to the theory based
on public policy, suggestions include prima facie tort,59 breach of
an implied contract,60 and violation of fourteenth amendment
due process l and equal protection.2
While academicians have recommended numerous bases for
recovery, the courts have acknowledged the exception only
under three interrelated theories. Initially these theories of re-
covery were used successfully in a trilogy of frequently cited
cases.8 3 In Petermann, the cause of action was based on a breach
case. See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
52. Academic pressure clearly has influenced New Hampshire. See Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974)(citing several law review articles
as support for its holding). See generally Peck, supra note 33, at 1.
53. See 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 624, 625 (1960).
54. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
55. Comment, Workmen's Compensation-No Private Right of Action For Retalia-
tory Discharge in North Carolina, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 139, 151 (1979); Summers,
supra note 34, at 491.
56. Peck, supra note 33, at 3.
57. See generally Peck, supra note 33, at 1. Several states have a very limited legis-
lative abrogation in the area of workmen's compensation. E.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8307c (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271, 271 (1975).
58. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See, e.g., 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 624
(1960).
59. See Blades, supra note 36, at 1418.
60. See, e.g., Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 325
(1974).
61. See A. BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER 39-50 (1967).
62. See Peck, supra note 33, at 35-42.
63. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text ihfra.
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of contract that was considered to be a violation of public pol-
icy. 4 A violation of public policy was also present in Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,65 but that court relied on a tort the-
ory to grant recovery. Finally, in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,6
the court relied on a breach of contract theory to allow recovery.
The Monge decision was based on bad faith and malicious moti-
vation, instead of a violation of public policy. These three inter-
related theories of recovery are practical manifestations of the
acceptance of the exception by different courts.
These cases provide courts in other jurisdictions with the
doctrinal avenues necessary to mitigate the harsh effects of the
common-law rule. The most persuasive support for acceptance
of the exception in South Carolina are the viability of the ex-
ception as a salubrious appendage to the common-law rule and
the current status of the exception's recognition in other
jurisdictions.
The viability of the exception is a function of the anachro-
nistic nature of the common-law rule itself. Analyses of the
traditional justifications, which have been offered to support the
rule, illustrate this anachronistic nature. Proponents of the rule
have proffered four basic justifications. The most frequently
used is the concept of freedom of contract; parties have an in-
herent right to contract as they please. An employment contract
necessarily includes, by choice of the parties, the right to termi-
nate the relationship without reason or for any reason. 7 Second,
"mutuality of contract" 68 is satisfied by the common-law rule
since both parties retain an equal right to terminate.69 Third,
the rule protects the parties' expectations with respect to the
contractual relationship.70 The employer expects to retain full
64. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 186, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).
65. 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427-28 (1973)(tort of retaliatory discharge).
66. 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
67. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Feinman,
The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 118, 129-30
(1976).
68. Mutuality of contract is an abstract concept dealing with the relative distribu-
tion of the burdens and benefits to the parties under the terms of the contract. See
generally Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119, 330 P.2d 625 (1958)(mutuality of exchanged
executory promises); Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735
(1955)(mutuality and illusory contracts).
69. Summers, supra note 34, at 484, 491.
70. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 432-33.
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control over business policy, unhampered by a limited contract,
while the employee expects to be able to quit at any time. Fi-
nally, the common-law rule is economically justifiable because
employers are able to move their capital quickly and without ex-
pense from salaries to other areas more conducive to industrial
expansion.71
When these four justifications are applied to the realities of
contemporary society, the anachronism becomes evident; thus
the justifications tend to vitiate rather than to support the rule.
In the modern employer-employee relationship, equality of bar-
gaining power is a fiction. Employment contracts "are imposed
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by the corporate employer. '7 2 The
employee has no real freedom in his efforts to obtain an accept-
able contract. The employers' freedom of contract has been
eroded by labor unions which impose terms and lobby for legis-
lative restrictions in employment and termination procedures. 3
The National Labor Relations Act,7 4 statutes in over twenty
states prohibiting ravial discrimination in hiring and promo-
tion, the Fair Labor Standards Act,7" and, in more than fifteen
states, legislative prohibition of age discrimination in employ-
ment7 demonstrate that neither federal nor state legislators
consider the right to freely contract inviolable. Because the em-
ployee has no real freedom to contract and because the em-
ployer's freedom has been encroached upon significantly by un-
ions and legislatures, this concept is no justification for the
common-law rule.
Similarly, the mutuality of contract concept does not neces-
sarily support the common-law rule in light of modern employ-
ment conditions. Commentators have stressed the obvious im-
portance of employment to the employee.78 In an era of high
unemployment, an employee's "dependence is not exclusively
economic," but extends to the need for social status and self-
71. Id.
72. Note, supra note 35, at 1443.
73. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 433; Peck, supra note 33, at 8.
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
75. See Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 429.
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 255 (1976).
77. See Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 430.
78. Note, supra note 35, at 1444.
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esteem.79 No mutuality exists in this area as that term tradition-
ally has been conceptualized. The employee may have the right
to quit, but social and economic factors may render the exercise
of that right impractical or impossible. The employer's right to
fire, however, remains a valid and continuing option. The con-
cept of mutuality may serve, however, as persuasive justification
for abrogating or excepting from the common-law rule. The
South Carolina court in two recent cases8" asserted that "[ilt is
implicit in any contract for employment that the employee...
has a duty of fidelity to his employer.""' Other cases imply a
requirement that employees perform their jobs in a reasonably
satisfactory manner.8 2 From these implied terms benefiting the
employer, a duty of good faith and fair dealing by the employer
toward the employee may be extrapolated. 3 Implying such a
duty on the part of the employer promotes mutuality. Under
such a rationale, an employer should not be able to terminate
his employee's job without justification, and, even then, only in a
manner consonant with good faith. 4
If the common-law rule ever conformed to the actual expec-
tations of both parties to the employment contract, those ex-
pectations have now changed drastically.8 5 The rule's origin can
be traced to Professor Wood's nineteenth-century treatise on
master-servant relations and the quick acceptance of his state-
ments in the courts of New York.8" Authorities are in agreement
that Professor Wood's formulation of the rule in 1817 was both
79. Id. See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 67 (1971).
80. Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 270 S.C. 489, 242 S.E.2d 551 (1978);
Loundes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
81. Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 270 S.C. at 491, 242 S.E.2d at 552.
82. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 435.
83. See Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textural Fibers, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491
(D.S.C. 1970).
84. Standards of good faith may include notice, hearings, severance pay, etc. See
England, supra note 34, at 505-06.
85. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 433. Blumrosen asserts that
both employees and employers now expect fair treatment and fair dealing,
proof before discipline, and uniform enforcement of reasonable rules of con-
duct and discipline. These expectations exist whether or not there is collective
bargaining, and they cannot be protected under the principle that employment
contracts are to be regarded by the courts as presumptively at will.
Id. See also notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text infra.
86. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 133, at 272 (1877). See Feinman, supra note
67, at 128-29.
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unsupportable and erroneous.11 It is unlikely, therefore, that the
rule represented the expectation of either employers or employ-
ees even then," and modern expectations are even less likely to
be consistent with the rule.
Evidence that "both employees and employers now expect
fair treatment and fair dealing"89 exists in contemporary corpo-
rate structure. Seniority, retirement, and other employee fringe-
benefit programs commonly are implemented by employers to
foster fidelity and encourage conscientious, hard work. The
value of these benefits to the employee fairly approximates the
employer's costs. Normal expectations of fair dealing arise when
this system of reciprocal benefits is combined with the realiza-
tion that members of management are also employees in the
multitiered corporate system. Because the boss is also an em-
ployee, lower-level employees expect "that management should
recognize basic rights to job security."90 Authorities have sug-
gested that the common-law rule "permits employers. . . to...
discharge employees in a manner that is not consistent with
standards of civilized society." 91 The influences of contemporary
corporate policy support the employee's expectation of fair
treatment-treatment that would instead be "consistent with
the standards of civilized society."
Economic realities suggest that contemporary society is
quite different from the period of rapid industrialization that
spawned the common-law rule in the late nineteenth century.
Militating against retention of the rule of terminability at-will
and without cause are five modern economic factors. First, the
high unemployment rate and statistics demonstrating that at
least sixty to sixty-five percent of the work force is employed
under at-will contracts92 combine to create instability and eco-
nomic uncertainty in the work force. Second, some authorities
assert that the employee's interest in the continuation of his em-
87. Peck, supra note 33, at 2; Summers, supra note 34, at 485. From the perspective
of a Marxist histo-economist, the justification for Wood's statement of the rule was to
enable capitalists to exercise unyielding control over labor and hence to advance indus-
trialism. Feinman, supra note 67, at 131.
88. Feinman, supra note 67, at 131.
89. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 433.
90. Note, supra note 34, at 1445.
91. Peck, supra note 33, at 49.
92. Peck, supra note 33, at 9.
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ployment contract rises to the level of a constitutionally pro-
tected property right. 3 Third, vast industrial expansion no
longer is a primary goal of society in the United States; rather,
the goals of modern society seem better represented by the atti-
tudes underlying the civil rights movement of the 1960s and eco-
nomic relief programs of the 1970s. These attitudes are charac-
terized more by equality and fairness than by capitalistic
yearnings. Fourth, approximately twenty-eight percent of the
national work force is protected by union contracts; the benefits
of grievance and arbitration procedures available under the
usual collective bargaining agreements94 conform more closely to
employee expectations of fairness and fulfillment of economic
needs than does the common-law rule. South Carolina's contin-
ued adherence to the harsh common-law rule may become a fac-
tor promoting the unionization of this typically nonunion state.
Fifth, other nations have recognized that the rule of terminabil-
ity at-will and without cause is disconsonant with modern eco-
nomic reality.9 5 Thus economic realities-in a manner similar to
freedom of contract, mutuality of contract, and employer-em-
ployee expectations-no longer support the common-law rule.
An exception for discharge in bad faith or in violation of
public policy is necessary, therefore, to eliminate the anachronis-
tic nature of the traditional common-law rule. Not only is an
exception necessary, but it is also viable in light of the effects of
contemporary social realities on the four justifications for the
law of at-will employment contracts. None of the justifications,.
as modified by modern realities, militate against the exception,
and several strongly support it. The exception is indeed a viable
and judicially practicable alternative to the harsh rule.
The status of the exception in the fifty-one jurisdictions of
the United States is not entirely clear. In Hudson, the South
Carolina Supreme Court asserted that courts in only "a minority
of jurisdictions. . . have recognized an exception to the general
rule."9' 6 The court cites cases in only four states-Indiana, Mas-
93. Summers, supra note 34, at 532. But see England, supra note 34, at 471 (the
employee's property-right theory is unsound; one cannot assign a job like one can assign
a house).
94. Peck, supra note 33, at 8-10.
95. Summers, supra note 34, at 508-19.
96. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 813.
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sachusetts, Oregon, and California.97 The court's citations, how-
ever, do not indicate the full extent of the acceptance of the ex-
ception. Twenty-five states have considered adoption of the
exception in at least one case. 98 Since 1959, only two states of
the twenty-five, Alabama and Florida, have unequivocally re-
jected the exception.9 Missouri state courts have rejected the
exception in all forms,100 but a Missouri federal court may have
recognized a public policy variety of the exception in dictum;10
thus Missouri's position is equivocal. The courts of Utah and
Louisiana are noncommittal in their response to the issue.102 At
least twenty of the twenty-five states, however, recognize the vi-
ability of the exception in one or more of its forms. 0 3 Thus, the
97. Id. (citing Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)).
98. The twenty-five states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See notes 99-103 infra.
99. The two states rejecting the exception are Alabama, Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire
Hospital, 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1979), and Florida, Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So.
2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
100. Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961);
Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956). But see Mitchell v. St. Louis
County, 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. App. 1978)(dictum)(referred to exception).
101. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322 (D.C. Mo. 1975)(court
found no clear public policy violated).
102. Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1974); Mann v.
American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978).
103. The twenty states showing a positive reception to the exception are listed
below:
Arizona-See Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977)(dic-
tum)(employee fired for refusing to consent to psychological tests; although court held
mere bad faith not sufficient to support excepion, violation of public policy apparently
would be sufficient).
California-See Raden v. City of Azusa, 97 Cal. App. 3d 336, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689
(1979)(employee fired for filing workmen's compensation claim; civil remedy in tort was
available); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1961)(employee fired for attempting to unionize; public policy supported ex-
ception); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959)(employee fired for refusing to commit perjury; recovery allowed under public
policy exception). But see Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1960)(employee fired for accepting jury duty; court refused to extend exception).
Colorado-See Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. App.
1978) (dictum) (nurse fired for refusing to falsify documents; court found no public policy
of "fair dealing," but recognized public policy exception).
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Hudson opinion's characterization of the minority status of the
Idaho-See Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977)(dictum)(employee fired for alleged misappropriation of funds; no facts to support
exception but public policy version recognized).
Illinois-See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 23 Ill. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978)(employee
fired for filing workmen's 6ompensation claim; public policy exception supported re-
covery); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977)(em-
ployee fired for filing workmen's compensation claim; public policy exception supported
recovery).
Indiana-See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973)(workmen's compensation); Martin v. Platt, - Ind. App. - , 386 N.E.2d 1026
(1979)(dictum)(employee fired for reporting supervisor taking kickbacks; court stated
that legislature must define public policy, but exception recognized).
Iowa-See Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978)(dic-
tum)(employee fired for making false statements against employer; court found no viola-
tion of public policy, but recognized exception).
Kansas-See Johnston v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d
313 (1976)(employee fired for reporting another's embezzlement; court allowed exception
based on tort and implied one exists based on public policy). But see Lorson v. Falcon
Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449 (1974)(court held employee presented no cause
of action).
Kentucky-See Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977)(dic-
tum)(employee fired for attending night school; court found no violation of public policy
under facts, but recognized exception).
Massachusetts-See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., - Mass. - , 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977)(salesman fired for "bonus sale credit" received; recovery granted on
an implied covenant of good faith theory).
Michigan-See Prussing v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 366, 269 N.W.2d 181
(1978)(bad-faith exception recognized, but no recovery because plaintiff did not sign affi-
davit; willingness to abrogate the common-law rule indicated); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976)(employee fired for filing workmen's compensa-
tion claim; exception allowed if firing in violation of public policy or statute). But see
Hendren v. Consumers Power Co., 72 Mich. App. 349, 249 N.W.2d 419 (1977)(no cause of
action for wrongful dismissal based on age; capricious discharge allowed).
New Hampshire-See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974)(employee fired after dispute about her "going out" with foreman; recovery al-
lowed under exception based on bad faith and maliciousness).
New Jersey-See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 399
A.2d 1023 (1979)(doctor dismissed after dispute about his desire for full use of skills in
drug research; exception for violation of public policy allowed but to be circumscribed on
case-by-case basis); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978)(nurse
fired for refusing to undertake illegal duties; exception recognized in public interest).
New York-See Wegman v. Dairylea Corp., Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 108, 376 N.Y.S.2d
728 (1975)(dictum)(employee fired for refusal to illegally standardize milk products; ex-
ception based on tort not allowed, but court left open exception based on breach of con-
tract). Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1978)(dic-
tum)(employee fired for political beliefs; public policy exception recognized, but no
violation of public policy found on these facts).
North Carolina-See Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971)(employee
fired for assertion of constitutional rights; exception recognized). But see Dockery v.
Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978)(retaliatory discharge for
16
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exception may not have been quite accurate.
Authors of the most recent articles on this issue confidently
indicate that the current dispute is not about the acceptability
of the exception, but rather concerns the proper governmental
branch to legally adopt the exception.104 Some authorities have
argued that the courts have the responsibility to modify the
common-law rule because the only at-will employees who face
the harshness of the rule are, of course, unorganized employees.
Being unorganized, these employees lack lobbying strength
before the legislature. 05 In a traditionally nonunion state, this
lack of power is particularly injurious to the interests of at-will
employees because any vote for employee rights appears pro-
union to legislators' constituents. Other authorities, however,
have argued that abrogation or modification by statute is more
propitious and more probable. Courts, as institutions guided by
precedent, tend to experience inertia and naturally avoid "un-
charted territory." 10 6
filing of workmen's compensation claim not in violation of public policy as established by
legislature).
Oregon-See Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978)(exception
based on violation of public policy recognized when employee fired for filing workmen's
compensation claim); Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141
(1976) (dictum) (employee/shareholder fired for demanding right to view corporate books;
public policy exception recognized, but not applicable on these facts); Nees v. Hocks 272
Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)(employee fired for accepting jury duty; exception allowed
for firing in violation of public policy).
Pennsylvania-See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974) (dictum) (salesman fired for pointing c.t unsafe product although recovery not al-
lowed under exception, court acknowledged its responsibility to society and pertinence of
exception under some facts); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386
A.2d 119 (1978)(employee fired for accepting jury duty; exception supported recovery).
Texas-See Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)(em-
ployee fired for filing workmen's compensation claim; violation of public policy, as estab-
lished by statute, supported recovery).
Washington-See Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764
(1977) (dictum) (firing characterized as age discrimination, not in violation of public pol-
icy, but public policy exception recognized).
West Virginia-See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)(em-
ployee of bank fired for reporting violation of consumer credit statute to superior; excep-
tion supported recovery when motive contravened public policy).
104. Peck, supra note 33, at 1; Comment, supra note 55, at 151.
105. Peck, supra note 33, at 3.
106. Peck, supra note 34, at 491; Comment, supra note 55 at 151. Texas has
adopted a limited statute. Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980).
Minimum elements of fairness for any statutory scheme purporting to protect employees
should include:
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The South Carolina Supreme Court in Hudson did not re-
ject the possibility of adopting the exception to the common-law
rule, but neither did the court indicate that its attitude toward
the exception was favorable. The opinion contains the language
"even if this exception to the general rule were to be recog-
nized . . . .-o Read together with the Ross decision and the
consistent application of the common-law rule in past South
Carolina cases,108 Hudson does not represent a positive recogni-
1. Guidelines for the tribunal and industry as to "fair" standards should be
publicized in a government Code of Practice. A "roving inspectorate" should
be established with powers to examine existing dismissal procedures and to
recommend reforms. "Unfair" dismissals in breach of such recommended re-
forms should result in double compensation for the worker and the denial of
government contracts to the firm in question.
2. The tribunal should have a broad discretion to determine "fairness" sub-
ject to the following, which should be stated in the Code of Practice:
(a) Certain grounds should be automatically unfair in addition to those
currently prohibited in human rights and labour legislation, notably sex-
ual orientation, familial relationship and political opinion. Redundancy
should only be a "fair" reason for dismissal if a "reasonable" employer
would have cut back on labour in the circumstances of the case, and if
the employer gives reasonable notice, attempts to avoid redundancy by
other means, tries to find the worker other employment in his or as-
sociate firms, allows time off to find other work, and selects those to be
made redundant in accordance with a bilaterally formulated procedure,
which may be "last in-first out". In addition, statutory compensation
for "fair" redundancy dismissals should be introduced.
(b) The dismissal procedure must be formulated and administered bi-
laterally and provide for "progressive discipline", notice of the alleged
offence, right to state a case, right of appeal to a body above the original
decision-making body, maintenance of the "status quo" pending final
determination, and the onus of proving "fairness" should be on the
employer.
(c) The work rules and penalties for breach thereof should be formu-
lated bilaterally and publicized, they, should be applied consistently and
non-discriminatorily, any changes therein or new rules should be publi-
cized and a reasonable period for readjustment allowed, dismissal should
be "unfair" where the employer raises new offences so as to "surprise"
the worker, employer condonation of previous offences should preclude
their being utilized to discharge a worker subsequently, even in combi-
nation with a fresh offence committed by the worker, the severity of the
penalty must be related to the nature of the offence and the offender so
that mitigating circumstances are taken into account, a minimum one
year "wipe the slate clean" provision should apply universally, and the
tribunal should be allowed to question the employer's business decisions
by reference to the "reasonable" employer.
England, supra note 34, at 505-06.
107. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 813.
108. See notes 40, 43 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss1/6
CONTRACTS
tion of the exception.
The common-law rule, allowing the termination of at-will
employment contracts by either party at any time for any reason
or no reason at all, is no longer supported by the justifications
that have been offered for it over the past century. The justifica-
tions of freedom to contract, mutuality of contract, expectations
of the parties, and economic realities support either a broad ex-
ception to the rule or its complete abrogation. Courts in at least
twenty of the twenty-five jurisdictions that have considered this
issue have viewed favorably an exception which balances the in-
terests of the employer, the employee, and society. South Caro-
lina, in Ross and Hudson, held firmly to the common-law rule.
For political reasons there appears to be little hope that the
South Carolina legislature will act on this subject. The obliga-
tion to reconsider the exception, therefore, falls squarely on the
state's supreme court.
III. FORM OF NOTIFICATION UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code 1 9 by the South
Carolina legislature established a comprehensive network of
rules governing business transactions in this state. Judicial inter-
pretation, however, is necessary to fill gaps in the statutory lan-
guage. Since the terms of the U.C.C. must be applied to a never-
ending variety of business transactions, its initial interpretation
is especially difficult.
A particularly troublesome area of the U.C.C. has been the
meaning of the term "notify."110 The U.C.C. definition fails to
indicate expressly whether notification must be in writing to be
effective."' Certainty in the meaning of this term 2 is vital since
109. S.C. CODE: ANN. §§ 36-1-101 to 36-11-108 (1976). South Carolina adopted the
U.C.C. in 1954.
110. Note, Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REv.
520, 520 (1973). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, 1102-05 (1968).
111. The definitional section of the U.C.C. states only that
a person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another by taking such
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course
whether or not such other actually comes to know of it. A person "receives" a
notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the con-
1980]
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it appears frequently in the U.C.C. 113 and may have a direct im-
pact on the enforceability of contracts between parties to a busi-
ness transaction.1 4 In 1979, the South Carolina Supreme Court
first considered the proper form of notification under the U.C.C.,
in Southeastern Steel Co. v. Burton Block & Concrete Co."15
The court clearly concluded that notification must be in writing
in order to be effective under the U.C.C., but its analysis cannot
withstand critical review.
Burton Block and Concrete Company (Burton Block) was a
subcontractor on the Beaufort Waterfront Project. Since its
tasks included the construction of prestressed concrete mem-
bers, Burton Block contracted with Southeastern Steel Company
(Southeastern Steel) to supply it with steel reinforcement bars
(rebar), a necessary component of these prestressed members.
Southeastern Steel made a number of deliveries of rebar to the
construction site which "were inspected at once, and complaints
of nonconforming and/or defective rebar were made by tele-
phone to Southeastern.""' Burton Block refused to pay the
amount due for the alledgedly defective rebar. Southeastern
Steel, denying receipt of any notification regarding the defects,
sued Burton Block for the balance due on the contract. The
rebar remained on Burton Block's job site. 17
The special referee concluded that Burton Block owed
Southeastern Steel more than $27,000. The trial court, however,
offset this amount by more than $14,000, which represented the
cost of the defective rebar rejected by Burton Block through the
telephone complaints. Justice Ness, writing for a unanimous" 8
tract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for
receipt of such communications.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(26) (1976).
112. The term "notify" and related terms "notice," "notification," and "send no-
tice" are defined and used similarly. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(25), (26), (27), &
(38) (1976).
113. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-602, -604, -607, -608, -612, 36-3-302, -304, 36-4-
303, 36-9-312, -504 (1976).
114. Late or insufficient notification may result in forfeiture of rights. See generally
Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, 1102-05 (1968) and cases cited therein.
115. - S.C. - , 258 S.E.2d 888 (1979).
116. Id. at -' 258 S.E.2d at 889 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at -' 258 S.E.2d at 888-89.
118. The South Carolina Supreme Court first issued an opinion on July 31, 1979, in
which Justice Littlejohn dissented to the written notification requirement laid down by
the majority. Without explanation, Justice Littlejohn switched to the majority view in
[Vol. 32
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supreme court, concluded that Burton Block's telephone notifi-
cation to Southeastern Steel did not satisfy the requirements of
the U.C.C., and thus, Burton Block was not entitled to the
offset.
119
The supreme court asserted that the case turned on the suf-
ficiency of oral notification under U.C.C. section 2-602 which
provides that "[r]ejection of goods must be within a reasonable
time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the
buyer seasonably notifies the seller. '120 Relying on authority
from outside this jurisdiction,1 21 the court held that the trial
court "committed an error of law in concluding that oral notice
of rejection suffices under the UCC. 1 22 The stated policy under-
lying this holding was its consistency with "the better business
practice."123 The court interjected that "[i]t is inconceivable...
that a business concern, claiming an offset of more than $14,000,
would not have registered its complaints to the supplier in writ-
ing."12 This holding is only superficially sound; further analysis
of the court's sources of authority and policy reasoning indicate
that the court's reliance on the insufficiency-of-oral-notification
theory was unwise. Several alternative theories were available
for a similar resolution of the dispute.
In support of its interpretation of the notification require-
ment under the U.C.C., the supreme court relied on three
sources of authority: (1) case law seemingly in accord with the
requirement of a writing, (2) an apparent lack of case law al-
lowing oral rejections, and (3) a well-known commercial code
hornbook. When examined closely, however, these sources do
not necessarily support the court's holding in Southeastern
Steel Co.
The court cites a 1965 Pennsylvania case, Julian C. Cohen
Salvage Corp. v. Eastern Electric Sales Co.,125 as the principal
the final opinion of September 26, 1979. The only changes in the second opinion dealt
with a tax issue unrelated to the U.C.C. notification issue.
119. - S.C. at _, 258 S.E.2d at 888-89.
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-602(1) (1976).
121. The court cited a Pennsylvania and an Illinois case, Burton Block's inability to
cite any case in its favor, and a commercial code hornbook. - S.C. at , 258 S.E.2d
at 889-90. See notes 125-32 and accompanying text infra.
122. - S.C. at , 258 S.E.2d at 890.
123. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 889.
124. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 890.
125. 205 Pa. Super. 26, 206 A.2d 331 (1965).
1980]
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precedent for its proposition that notification must be in writ-
ing. This case, however, is distinguishable and supports the pro-
position, if at all, only in dictum. The buyer in Julian C. Cohen
Salvage Corp. had an opportunity to inspect the goods at the
seller's warehouse before purchase, and did not attempt any
complaint or rejection until one month after receipt of the
goods. The Pennsylvania court stressed these facts in its deter-
mination that the buyer failed to notify the seller of rejection at
all.126 When viewed from this perspective, the portion of the Ju-
lian C. Cohen Salvage Corp. opinion quoted by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court indicates that the Pennsylvania court was
not ruling on the issue of oral versus written notification.
In order to avoid the conclusion that ... [the buyer] had ac-
cepted the ... [goods], . . . [the buyer] offered testimony that
it had notified ... [the seller] of its rejection shortly after the
... [goods were] received. However, there was no written no-
tice of rejection. Moreover, the testimony that ... [the buyer]
notified ... [the seller] of the rejection of these goods is not
credible .... 127
The buyer's failure to give written notification was not the fatal
factor in its case; instead, the lack of written notification was
merely one element in the proof of the seller's allegations that
no notification was given. The buyer's failure to show a written
notification merely undermined his credibility. Instead of hold-
ing that the alleged oral notification was insufficient-the pro-
position for which Southeastern Steel Co. cites the Julian C.
Cohen Salvage Corp. case-Julian C. Cohen Salvage Corp. held
that "in view of its failure to act with respect to the. . . [goods]
it is clear that the . . . [buyer] accepted the goods.", 28 Stated
simply, the Pennsylvania court did not believe that the buyer
had given the seller any notification of rejection. The Julian C.
Cohen Salvage Corp. case, therefore, is not sound authority for a
written notification requirement.
The Southeastern Steel Co. opinion also refers to an Illinois
Appellate Court case, Grossman v. D'Or,1'29 as "holding tele-
126. Id. at 28, 206 A.2d at 333.
127. Id. at 29, 206 A.2d at 334 (emphasis added).
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. 98 Ill. App. 2d 198, 240 N.E.2d 266 (1968).
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phonic notice insufficient under . . .the UCC."'130 The buyer's
attempted notification in Grossman consisted of several uncom-
pleted telephone calls. The seller was never reached by phone.
The case did not hold that telephone notification was insuffi-
cient; rather, Grossman stands for the proposition that "uncom-
pleted telephone calls are [not] evidence of notice within the
meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code." 131 Grossman, there-
fore, also is not authority for the rule announced in Southeast-
ern Steel Co.
13 2
The second "source" of authority relied upon by the su-
preme court was the buyer's inability to cite any case holding
that oral notification is sufficient under the U.C.C.3 s Unless the
buyer, Burton Block, simply failed to anticipate this question
from the court, such failure is indeed a mystery.1 34 At least nine
other jurisdictions have held oral notification to be sufficient
under U.C.C. section 2-602 and other sections in Article Two.1 3
5
130. - S.C. at - , 258 S.E.2d at 890.
131. 98 IM. App. at 203, 240 N.E.2d, at 268 (1968).
132. Only one case clearly holds that notification must be written. See Foundation
Discounts, Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970). That case, however, has been
severely criticized for its misinterpretation of authority. See Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v.
Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 577-78, 287 A.2d 261, 264 (1972).
Several other cases lend support to the proposition that written notification is pref-
erable. See A & G Constr. Co. v. Reid Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207, 1216 (Alaska
1976)(distinguishable from Southeastern Steel Co. because decision based on special
Alaskan Statute of Frauds); North Am. Steel Corp. v. Siderius, Inc., 75 Mich. App. 391,
401, 254 N.W.2d 899, 905 (1977)(dictum)(requirement of written notification implied in
court's holding that telephone call constituted "rejection," but only subsequent letter
constituted "notification").
A few cases have held that notification must be written when the pertinent U.C.C.
section requires that a party "send" notice. See Available Iron Metal Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 56 Ill. App. 3d 516, 371 N.E.2d 1032 (1977)(U.C.C. § 4-302) Delay First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976) (U.C.C. § 9-
504); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Bank, 538 P.2d 298 (Utah 1975)(U.C.C.
Article 4; distinction between "sending" notice and "giving" notice). These cases are
clearly distinguishable from Southeastern Steel Co. because § 36-2-602 does not require
the buyer to "send" notification. For statutory text, see note 111 supra. The view that
written notification is required by the word "send" has been severely criticized for
"creat[ing] a new... statute of frauds and add[ing] to the mountain of paper" already
required. 17 U.C.C. REP. 480 (editor's note).
133. - S.C. at - , 258 S.E.2d at 891.
134. The trial court ruled that oral notification was sufficient. Id. at -, 258
S.E.2d at 892. The brief for respondent Burton Block indeed cited no cases on this issue.
135. The nine jurisdictions are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, which are represented
by the following cases: E.g., Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972)(tele-
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In addition, the courts in at least seven states have held that
oral notification is satisfactory under comparable provisions in
other articles of the U.C:C., particularly Articles Three, Four,
and Nine.138 No fewer than fourteen jurisdictions have expressly
held that the U.C.C. definition of "notify" or "notice" encom-
passes both face-to-face oral notification and notification by
telephone.137 When compared with the paucity of cases support-
ing the requirement of written notification,138 these seventeen
cases from numerous jurisdictions indicate that the Southeast-
ern Steel Co. position holding oral notification insufficient under
the U.C.C. places South Carolina in the minority of jurisdictions
phone notification acceptable under U.C.C. § 2-602); Page v. Camper City & Mobile
Home Sales, 292 Ala. 562, 297 So. 2d 810 (1974)(face-to-face oral notification acceptable
under U.C.C. § 2-607); Smart Chevrolet Co. v. Davis, 262 Ark. 500, 502, 558 S.W.2d 147,
148 (1977)("[w]ritten notice is not required by the Uniform Commercial Code"; case
brought under U.C.C. § 2-714); VLN Corp. v. American Office Equip. Co., 536 P.2d 863,
867 (Colo. App. 1975)("there is no requirement that notification be formal or written"
under U.C.C. § 2-607); Robinson v. Jonathan Logan Financial, 277 A.2d 115 (D.C.
1971)(dictum)(telephone notification not insufficient under U.C.C. § 2-602); Warren's
Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 12 Ga. App. 578, 171 S.E.2d 643 (1969)(tele-
phone notification acceptable under U.C.C. §§ 2-605, -607); Smith v. Butler, 19 Md. App.
467, 311 A.2d 813 (1973)(efforts to contact by numerous unsuccessful telephone calls
sufficient under U.C.C. § 2-607); International Paper Co. v. Margrove, Inc., 75 Misc. 2d
763, 766, 348 N.Y.S.2d 916, 919 (1973)(no authority "that the required notice must be in
writing" under U.C.C. §§ 1-201(2Q), 2-607); Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C.
385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972)(face-to-face statement may be sufficient as rejection under
U.C.C. § 2-601; telephone notification acceptable under U.C.C. § 2-608; reference to
U.C.C. § 2-602).
For the proposition that "sister state interpretations of the Code are more than
mere persuasive authority," see A. J. Armstrong, Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97
N.J. Super. 246, 259, 234 A.2d 737, 744 (1967).
136. The seven states are Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, and New York. Cases holding that oral notification is acceptable under Articles 3,
4, and 9 of the U.C.C. include: GAC Credit Corp. v. Small Business Administration, 323
F. Supp. 795 (W.D. Mo. 1971)(under U.C.C. § 9-312); Hall v. Owen County State Bank,
- Ind. App. -, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977)(under U.C.C. § 9-504); Leaderbrand v. Cen-
tral State Bank, 202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1 (1969)(under U.C.C. § 3-508); Crest Inv. Trust,
Inc. v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287 A.2d 261 (1972)(under U.C.C. § 9-504); Fairchild v.
Williams Feed, Inc., 169 Mont. 18, 544 P.2d 1216 (1976)(under U.C.C. § 9-504); Sun
River Cattle Co. v. Miners Bank, 164 Mont. 237, 521 P.2d 679 (1974)(under U.C.C. §§ 3-
508, 4-104, -302); A. J. Armstrong Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 246,
234 A.2d 737 (1967)(under U.C.C. § 9-504); Security Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 79
Misc. 2d 523, 358 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1974)(under U.C.C. § 3-508).
137. See notes 135 & 136 supra. The fourteen jurisdictions are Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
138. See notes 125-32 and accompanying text supra.
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on this issue.
The final source of authority cited by the supreme court to
support its holding is the following quote from the White and
Summers Uniform Commercial Code hornbook:
Section 2-602 provides that a buyer who wishes to reject must
"seasonably notify" the seller .... Needless to say such re-
jection ... notice should be in writing, and it should be care-
fully drafted. Those who have depended upon non-written no-
tice or equivocal notice of rejection have not fared well in the
courts.1
3 9
On its face this language appears to support the court's position;
under careful scrutiny, however, this passage does not stand for
the proposition espoused by the South Carolina court for three
reasons. First, instead of using mandatory language such as
"must" or "shall," the authors used the more permissive term
"should" with reference to the need for writing. This wording
intimates that a suggestion is being offered to the business com-
munity, not a statement of the law for practitioners. Second, the
court omitted a portion of the passage quoted from the horn-
book. The omitted portion refers to U.C.C. sections 2-605 and 2-
608, both of which differ from 2-602 because they require partic-
ularized objections by the buyer.1 0 The necessity of a writing in
instances requiring particularization is logically justifiable, but
that is not the case in section 2-602. The court's later reference
to "such. . . notice," in the second of the quoted sentences, ap-
pears to refer to the omitted discussion of sections 2-605 and 2-
608 rather than section 2-602. Thus, the hornbook authors seem
to be admonishing businessmen to be especially cautious when
139. - S.C. at ,, 258 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting J. WHTE & R. SUMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3, at 265 (1972)(emphasis added by court)). The full text of
the quoted paragraph follows:
Section 2-602 provides that a buyer who wishes to reject must "seasonably
notify" the seller, and section 2-608(2) contains a similar requirement for one
revoking acceptance. Note that under 2-605 a buyer who fails to particularize
his objection in connection with rejection may lose his right to rely on "the
unstated defect" to justify the rejection or to establish a breach. Needless to
say such rejection or revocation notice should be in writing, and it should be
carefully drafted. Those who have depended upon nonwritten notice or equivo-
cal notice of rejection have not fared well in the courts.
S. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, § 8-3, at 265 (emphasis added, footnote deleted). (This
language is unchanged in the second edition of the hornbook. Id. at 315 (2d ed. 1980)).
140. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-605, -608 (1976).
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dealing with sections 2-605 and 2-608. Finally, as authority for
the statement that "[t]hose who have depended upon nonwrit-
ten notice . . . have not fared well in the courts,"141 White and
Summers cite Julian C. Cohen Salvage Corp. and Grossman."
42
As noted above, these decisions turned, in part, on whether the
buyer notified the seller at all, rather than whether notice must
be in writing.143 The hornbook language quoted by the court in
Southeastern Steel Co., therefore, is not solid authority for the
court's conclusion that oral notice is legally insufficient.
White and Summers, however, do establish in other por-
tions of their hornbook that oral notification is sufficient under
the U.C.C. In discussing section 2-607, the authors state that
"an oral notice will suffice. 1 144 In the next paragraph, the writers
discuss the differences between notification under section 2-607
and section 2-602, but find the only difference to be the time for
the notification, not the form. 45 The authors also assert that Ar-
ticle Nine of the U.C.C. "permits oral notification. '146 Section 2-
602 and the comparable Article Nine sections refer to section 1-
201(26) to define "notify." This definition does not distinguish
between oral and written notification.1 47 Thus, in many respects,
the source referred to by the court to strengthen its holding in
Southeastern Steel Co. actually weakens it.
Two other commentators assert that oral notification is ac-
ceptable under the U.C.C. Professor Anderson, author of a
multi-volume treatise on the U.C.C., states that in order "[t]o
make an effective rejection of improper goods [under section 2-
602] the buyer must comply with two requirements": reasonable
time and seasonable notification. 148 Professor Anderson does not
intimate anywhere that written rejection is necessary and, in
fact, he states that under section 2-607 notification to the seller
"may be either oral or written. A telephone call is a sufficient
141. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3, at 265 (1972).
142. See notes 125-32 and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 126 & 131 and accompanying text supra.
144. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 141, § 11-9, at 348.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 25-5, at 918. See id. § 26-10, at 983.
147. See note 111 supra.
148. 2 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: TEXT, CASES, AND COMMEINTARY
§ 2-602:4, at 169 (2d ed. 1971).
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notice .... ,149 Another commentator has noted that under
both the old Uniform Sales Act and its replacement, the U.C.C.,
"no particular form of notice is required... notice may be oral
or written . . . . 150 The consensus of authoritative opinion,
therefore, embraces an interpretation of the term "notify" which
allows oral as well as written notification.
In addition to its reliance on three sources of authority, the
court in Southeastern Steel Co., relied on policy considerations.
The court emphasized that written notification was a "better
business practice.""' The rationale underlying this contention
was not explained. Various arguments can be suggested to sup-
port the court's position, but the most apparent reasons why
written notification constitutes the better practice are that a
writing will more efficiently convey the buyer's rejection and will
serve as reliable proof in any subsequent litigation.15 2 These rea-
sons are not without opposition, however, and arguments can be
formulated to support oral notification in terms of efficiency and
proof in litigation, expectations, and the spirit of the U.C.C.
Commentators 15 and a wealth of case law15 demonstrate
that "reasonable time" requirements are paramount. Surely tele-
phone notification is a more expeditious manner of informing
the seller of the problems with delivered goods than is a writing.
In one sense, at least, oral notification is less risky than written
notice because the buyer is immediately informed of the seller's
response. Each party can confirm concurrently the position of
the other. Written notice can be delayed in the mail indefinitely
with neither party knowing the other's position. Sufficient proof
of oral notification is not impossible and to deny the buyer the
right to notify orally simply in anticipation of litigation is un-
fair.155 Other equally difficult factual determinations are re-
quired of juries, for example, what is a "reasonable time" within
which a buyer's ignorance of breach of warranty under section 2-
149. Id. § 2-607:26, at 218.
150. Note, supra note 110, at 536.
151. - S.C. at - , 258 S.E.2d at 891.
152. The court concluded that oral notification is "ineffective to constitute rejec-
tion" and asserted that such notice is particularly ineffective "where there is conflicting
evidence." Id.
153. See Note, supra note 110, at 522.
154. E.g., Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, 1103-05 (1968) and cases cited therein.
155. See 17 U.C.C. REP. 480 (editor's note).
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607 is justified."' 6
Two categories of expectations must also be considered
-commercial expectations arising from a course of dealing or
trade and consumer expectations arising from unfamiliarity with
the commercial community. Much negotiation in the business
world takes place by telephone151 and businessmen naturally
have come to rely on that instrument to communicate informa-
tion quickly when attempting to solve problems en-
countered with delivered goods. Commentators explain that "the
courts have generally held that the standard for notice required
for individual consumers is not the same as that applied to
merchants."'5 8 A reasonable time period within which a con-
sumer may give notification is -generally longer than that for
commercial buyers 5 9 and, hence, the required form of notifica-
tion likewise should be relaxed. Consumers often do not have
secretarial resources nor the business acumen to draft a notice,
and the consumer accustomed to telephoning a catalogue sales
order naturally will expect the right to telephone a complaint.
Thus, the "possibility of injustice to the lay consumer" must be
evaluated carefully.'
Courts and commentators indicate that the spirit of the
U.C.C. requires no formality.'' The common law held that buy-
ers waived defects in and nonconformity of goods upon accept-
ance. The Uniform Sales Act eliminated the harshness of this
rule, but added the notice requirement to provide protection for
sellers. Notice gives sellers ample opportunity to cure defects or
prepare for settlement or litigation. The Uniform Sales Act,
therefore, balanced the benefit to buyers from elimination of the
common-law rule regarding waiver with protection to sellers
156. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607 (1976). See Note, supra note 110, at 525.
157. See generally Julian C. Cohen Salvage Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 205 Pa.
Super. 26, 29, 206 A.2d 331, 332-33 (1965); - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 891 (tele-
phone used frequently).
158. Note, supra note 110, at 527.
159. See Note, supra note 110, at 529.
160. See Note, supra note 110, at 524-25.
161. See, e.g., Southern Concrete Prods. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ga. App. 534, 191 S.E.2d
314 (1972); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, - Ind. App. -, 370 N.E.2d 918
(1977). See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 148, § 2-607:27, at 218. See also Annot.,
53 A.L.R.2d 270, at § 2[a] (1957)(analogy to cases under the Uniform Sales Act, the
predecessor to the U.C.C.).
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from creation of notice requirements."6 2 Under the Uniform
Sales Act, courts "recognized that the notice required. . may
be oral."163 The successor to the Uniform Sales Act, the U.C.C.,
preserved this balance.16 4 Since the policy reasons underlying
the notification provisions of the Sales Act are identical to those
underlying the U.C.C. requirements, courts' reasoning in cases
under the Sales Act can be applied when interpreting the U.C.C.
The purpose of notification is to communicate to the seller that
the buyer is dissatisfied with the goods. Formality is not the
goal. Oral and telephonic notification, conforms to the spirit of
the U.C.C. by protecting the seller's interests to the same extent
that written and formal notification does.
A review of the sources of authority for interpreting the no-
tification requirement of the U.C.C. demonstrates that the
Southeastern Steel Co. decision was based upon a less than
sturdy foundation. Two statements by the court intimate that
the crucial element in the case may not have been the legal in-
sufficiency of oral notification, but rather Burton Block's inabil-
ity to convince the court that it notified the seller at all. The
opinion emphasizes that "[t]here was no evidence of rejection
other than testimony of Burton's alleged telephone calls to
Southeastern."'" The court suggested that this type of notifica-
tion "is ineffective. . . particularly where there is conflicting ev-
idence of its receipt ... ."66 These statements suggest that the
supreme court did not believe the buyer. If that was the court's
position, the Southeastern Steel Co. opinion can be read as a
penalty for the buyer's unwise choice of notification form, rather
than the rule of law that only written notification is sufficient
under the U.C.C. Instead of fashioning such a rule to justify
holding for the seller, the court could have reached the same re-
sult under other more proper theories.
The authorities are in agreement that a "mere complaint" is
not sufficient to constitute notification under the U.C.C. 167 The
162. Note, supra note 110, at 540.
163. Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 270, at § 4 (1957).
164. Note, supra note 110, at 541.
165. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 889.
166. Id.
167. See Christensen v. McAndrews, 8 U.C.C. REP. 354 (1970); Bomyte Co. v. L-Co.
Cabinet Corp., 5 U.C.C. REP. 1060 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1968); See Note, supra note
110, at 526, 528.
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buyer must clearly establish that he is rejecting the goods. Had
the court investigated the legal sufficiency of the content of Bur-
ton Block's telephone conversations with Southeastern Steel, it
is possible that a result in favor of the seller could have been
sustained on this "mere complaint" theory. A permutation of
the attempted written notification rule could have been sup-
ported by incorporating a standard of reasonableness into the
preferred form of notification.16 Standards of reasonableness are
described in the U.C.C. section defining "notification" of a
party 69 and have been applied to the required time for notifica-
tion.1 70 Thus, a reasonable form of notification can be implied
from section 2-602. This standard of reasonableness can be ap-
plied flexibly according to the relative skills, experience, and ex-
pertise of the parties.17 1 A lay consumer, therefore, would be
held to a less stringent standard, while an experienced business
man would be held to a more exacting standard with respect to
time, content, and form of notification. The necessity for speed
and any usual course of dealings between the parties also enter
into a determination of reasonableness. By employing a standard
of reasonableness, the court would place sufficiency of the notifi-
cation form before the jury where other courts have advocated it
belongs.
17 2
The South Carolina Supreme Court purported to lend cer-
tainty to a troublesome area of commercial law by requiring that
notification under U.C.C. section 2-602 be written. The court's
use of authority and public policy, however, was not sound. Bus-
inessmen should not be confident that Southeastern Steel Co.
will be either perpetual or unaltered precedent. The much de-
sired certainty is thus undermined. The court could have
achieved a similar result through the use of alternative theories
without risking the untenable formulation of this new rule. If
Southeastern Steel Co. is a statement of a new rule requiring
written notification under the U.C.C., South Carolina joins a mi-
nority of jurisdictions asserting this position. At its next oppor-
168. See Fairchild v. Williams Feed, Inc., 169 Mont. 18, 23, 544 P.2d 1216, 1218-19
(1976)(reasonable notification includes oral notification).
169. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(26) (1976). See note 111 supra.
170. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, at § 39[b] (1968).
171. Note, supra note 110, at 527, 529.
172. E.g., Smith v. Butler, 19 Md. App. 467, 473, 311 A.2d 813, 817 (1973).
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tunity, the court should review its basis for this decision.
G. Marcus Knight
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